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We present a simulation-based approach for generating barrier certificate functions for safety ver-
ification of cyber-physical systems (CPS) that contain neural network-based controllers. A linear
programming solver is utilized to find a candidate generator function from a set of simulation traces
obtained by randomly selecting initial states for the CPS model. A level set of the generator function
is then selected to act as a barrier certificate for the system, meaning it demonstrates that no unsafe
system states are reachable from a given set of initial states. The barrier certificate properties are
verified with an SMT solver. This approach is demonstrated on a case study in which a Dubins car
model of an autonomous vehicle is controlled by a neural network to follow a given path.
1 Introduction
Self-driving cars, unmanned aerial vehicles, and certain kinds of robots are examples of autonomous
cyber-physical systems (ACPS), that is, physical systems controlled by software that are envisioned to
have no human operator. Remarkable success has been achieved by AI and machine learning algorithms
in solving complex tasks heretofore thought to require human intellect. This has led to a concerted effort
to utilize AI in embedded software for ACPS applications. We observe that the rapid advances in AI
have focused on expanding the scope and efficacy of the underlying techniques, but from a rigorous
mathematical perspective, there has been little achieved towards guaranteeing formal correctness of AI
algorithms and their impact on overall safety of ACPS applications in which they may be used.
There has been a sudden upsurge in research focusing on formal verification and testing for AI al-
gorithms in the last two years [4, 5, 12, 9]. These papers focus on analyzing the AI artifacts (such as
artificial neural networks, specifically focusing on deep neural networks). Such analysis provides a bet-
ter understanding of the robustness and safety of the artifact itself. When accompanied by environment
models, above analyses could be used to reason about the overall system safety as well; however, such
decompositional models, where the environment assumptions are provided in a form that is easily com-
posable with the verification or testing algorithms for AI artifacts, are difficult to obtain. On the other
hand, approaches such as [3] take a markedly different approach; they perform in situ reasoning about
the AI artifact in a closed-loop model of an ACPS. In our opinion, such approaches provide greater value
by directly reasoning about the closed-loop system safety. In this paper, we propose a method for verifi-
cation of closed-loop system models of ACPS, where the controller uses a neural network (NN). Thus,
our work goes one step further from existing approaches as it brings mathematical rigor through formal
verification to closed-loop ACPS models.
Our key idea is to automatically learn safety invariants for the closed-loop model. Such safety invari-
ants can take the form of barrier certificates. We automatically synthesize candidate barrier certificates
using simulation-guided techniques, such as those proposed in [11, 1, 2]. We then verify the overall
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2 Reasoning about Safety of Learning-Enabled Components in Autonomous Cyber-physical Systems
system safety by checking the validity of the barrier certificate conditions for the candidate using the
nonlinear δ -satisfiability solver dReal [7].
We demonstrate our technique on a simple case study of a path-following autonomous vehicle. This
vehicle uses an NN-based controller that was trained using reinforcement learning (policy learning using
evolutionary strategies). We prove that for the given kinematic models of motion of the vehicle, it
never leaves a “safe” region around a given fixed path. We caution the reader that as this is the first
attempt at verification of closed-loop ACPS models, we have not yet applied our technique to real-world
ACPS designs, and have thus not encountered the concomitant scalability challenges. Nevertheless, our
preliminary results are promising, as we are able to handle NN controllers with a thousand neurons and
nonlinear activation functions.
2 Preliminaries
In traditional control theory, techniques such as proportional-integral-derivative (PID) control and model
predictive control (MPC) employ stateful controllers, whose behaviors are defined by dynamic equations
that are functions of inputs and internal controller states. On the other hand, control schemes such
as linear-quadratic regulator (LQR) control use stateless controllers whose behaviors are defined by
instantaneous mappings from inputs to outputs. The goal of this work is to analyze systems where the
stateful and stateless controllers use AI-based algorithms. The most popular of these are controllers based
on NNs trained using reinforcement learning approaches such as policy learning. There are two main
kinds of neural controllers, the first of which is stateless controllers, which employ a form of feedforward
nonlinear control. These controllers could use shallow or deep NNs. The other kind of neural controllers
are those based on recurrent neural networks (RNNs); these employ feedback control and are stateful.
In this work, we focus on controllers based on (stateless) feedforward NNs, but note that the general
approach outlined in this paper is applicable to closed-loop models with RNNs as well, with the caveat
that a stateful controller will increase the query complexity of the verification question that we frame.
We will further elaborate on this aspect later.
We consider a plant model described as follows:
x˙ = fp(x,u), (1)
y = g(x), (2)
where x ∈ Rn is the state, u ∈ Rm is the input to the plant, fp is a locally Lipschitz-continuous vector
field, and g : Rn→ Rq defines the plant outputs.
The NN controller is given by
u = h(y), (3)
where h : Rq→ Rm is a function that maps plant outputs to plant inputs. We assume that h performs all
of the processing required to implement the NN, including applying the weights and activation functions
that define the NN, as well as performing any necessary preprocessing of the inputs. We assume that the
controller is stateless and locally Lipschitz-continuous.
Composing the plant with the controller yields
x˙ = fp(x,h(g(x))),
which we simplify to the following form:
x˙ = f (x). (4)
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Equation (4) represents a closed-loop model of the system, in the sense that it is a synchronous com-
position of the dynamical systems representing the plant model with the controller model to obtain an
autonomous system model (i.e., a dynamical system with no exogenous inputs).
Feedforward Neural Controller A feedforward neural controller is an NN that continuously maps a
multi-dimensional control input y (of dimension q) to a control output u of dimension m. Following
standard convention, for a network with M layers, we assume layer 1 is the input layer, and layer M is
the output layer, while layers 2, . . . ,M− 1 are the hidden layers. The `th layer (1 < ` ≤M) contains d`
neurons, and the output of the jth neuron in the `th layer is denoted v`, j, while the vector of outputs for
the `th layer is denoted V`. The `th layer is parameterized by a d`×d`−1 weight matrix, where d1 is the
number of inputs, W` and a bias vector B` of size d`. V` is given by the expression σ`(W` ·V`−1 +B`),
where σ` is a suitable activation function applied component-wise for the `th layer.
We note that previous work from the formal methods community focused on NNs with ReLU (rec-
tified linear unit) activation functions. A ReLU with input v essentially computes max(v,0); that is, it
is piecewise linear in the input, which makes it amenable to analysis by SMT solvers equipped with
linear theories. We do not impose any such restriction on activation functions, as we reduce the verifi-
cation questions to nonlinear queries over real numbers, which can be analyzed by dReal – a nonlinear
SMT solver based on interval constraint propagation. dReal is capable of handling Type 2 computable
functions, which are essentially real functions that can be numerically approximated. These include poly-
nomials, trigonometric functions, and exponentials [6]. Thus, we allow activation functions such as the
sigmoid function σ(v) = 1/(1+ e−v) and the hyperbolic tangent function σ(v) = tanh(v) (implemented
in MATLAB® as the tansig function, which has a faster implementation than the tanh function).
2.1 Safety Verification with Strict Barrier Certificates
A barrier certificate is an inductive invariant function for contin-uous-time dynamical systems [14, 13].
We assume that we are given an autonomous dynamical system described by (4), a set of possible initial
states X0, and a set of unsafe states U . Then, we define the barrier certificate as follows.
Strict Barrier Certificate A barrier certificate is a differentiable function B from the set of states of
the dynamical system to the set of reals. Let ∇B denote the gradient of B(x), i.e., ∇B = [ ∂B∂x1
∂B
∂x2 . . .
∂B
∂xn ].
Then, B(x) is called a strict barrier certificate for a dynamical system of the form specified in Eq. (4), if
it satisfies the following conditions:
(1) ∀x ∈ X0 : B(x)≤ 0,
(2) ∀x ∈U : B(x)> 0,
(3) ∀x : (B(x) = 0) =⇒ (∇B)T · f (x)< 0.
We observe that the existence of a suitable barrier certificate demonstrates that along any system
trajectory with the initial state in X0, a state in U is not reachable (in finite or infinite time). Thus, a
barrier certificate provides a powerful unbounded-time safety certificate of the system.
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3 Solution Overview
We present a method to perform verification of safety properties for CPSs that contain NN components.
Our approach closely follows the simulation-based barrier certificate strategy described in [11]. The key
idea in this approach is to define a barrier certificate as a level set of a generator function W (x), i.e.
the barrier certificate B(x) is the function W (x)− ` for some ` ∈ R>0. The generator function W (x) is
assumed to be a positive function that decreases along the system trajectories. We assume that W (x) is
specified using suitable templates, such as Sum-of-Squares polynomials, where the coefficients of the
monomial terms are to be determined.
The method starts by performing a collection of simulations to generate a set of linear constraints that
specify the positivity of the candidate generator function, and that it decreases along system trajectories.
We then check condition (3) from Definition 2.1; note that we can do this as ∇B = ∇W , since ` is a
constant. We check this condition using an SMT solver. The SMT solver either produces a counterexam-
ple (CEX) that results in an updated candidate generator function, or it returns UNSAT, which certifies
that the candidate is sound. Finally, we use the generator function to find the appropriate value of ` that
separates the initial condition set from the unsafe set, and thus acts as a barrier certificate for the system.
There are certain nuances in each of these steps that we now describe below.
The flowchart in Figure 1 illustrates the process. We first create a collection of linear constraints, as
described above, using results from simulations Φs. A linear program (LP) is solved to obtain a solution
that satisfies the constraints. The LP solution corresponds to a candidate generator function W (x).
Seed
Traces Φs
unionmultiTracesΦ f
Solve
LP(1)
Candidate
Generator
Function W
SMT Solver:
Check (5)
UNSAT?
CEX
Simulate
Compute
Level set
Level
set
SMT Solver:
Check
(6) & (7)
UNSAT?
Halt:
System is Safe
NO(2) YES
YES
NO(3)
(1,2,3) If the LP is infeasible or if the maximum number of
iterations to find a candidate generator function or a levelset is
reached, the algorithm terminates with no conclusions.
Figure 1: Procedure to verify safety property for NN-based system.
Next, an SMT solver is used to check the following property over the domain of interest:
∃x ∈D : (x 6∈ X0)∧ ((∇W )T · f (x)) ≥−γ. (5)
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The above query is UNSAT when for all x ∈ D \X0, the condition ((∇W )T · f (x)) < 0 holds, which
means the condition ((∇B)T · f (x)) < 0 holds (because B(x) =W (x)− `). Let L = {x |W (x)− ` ≤ 0}.
Note that the boundary of L (denoted ∂L) is the set where B(x) = 0. We later explain how we choose
` such that X0 ⊂ L , and L ⊂ D . In other words, we check the condition ((∇B)T · f (x)) < 0 over a set
that is a superset of ∂L, or the set B(x) = 0. Thus, the above condition being UNSAT, guarantees that
condition (3) in Def. 2.1 holds. For our experiments, we use γ = 10−6.
If the SMT solver returns SAT, then a corresponding CEX is returned in the form of an x∗ such that
∇B(x∗)T · f (x∗)≥−γ . This CEX is then used to generate new linear constraints, based on a simulation,
Φ f , obtained by using the CEX as an initial condition, and then another LP is solved to produce an
updated candidate generator function. This iterative process continues until the SMT solver returns
UNSAT.
Next, we try to compute the level set size ` of W (x) such that the set L (i.e. {x | B(x)< 0}) contains
the initial condition set X0 and does not intersect with the unsafe set U . The methods available to select
an appropriate ` value will depend on the class of the chosen generator function W and the geometry
of sets X0 and U . In the examples provided in the subsequent section, W is a quadratic function, X0 is
a rectangle, and U is a disjunction of halfspaces. For this case, the set L is an ellipsoid, and ` can be
selected to be any value that satisfies the following:
• Each vertex of X0 lies within L;
• Each halfspace defining U is disjoint from the ellipsoid L.
Once the level set size ` is selected, a pair of additional SMT queries is performed to check whether
X0 ⊂ L and L∩U = /0. As with (5), we check the satisfiability of the negation of these conditions with
the SMT solver:
∃x ∈ X0,x /∈ L, (6)
∃x ∈ L,x ∈U, (7)
which will return UNSAT if the desired property holds. If either of these queries returns SAT, then the
level set L does not satisfy the desired properties, and a new ` value should be selected. We can do this
efficiently by performing a binary search on a feasible range of ` values until the SMT solver returns
UNSAT for the queries 6 and 7.
If the final pair of queries returns UNSAT, then the procedure halts, and the function B(x) =W (x)−`
is proven to be a barrier certificate for the system, meaning that the system is proven to be safe. In the
next section, we present an example that demonstrates the above method to prove safety for an ACPS
with an NN controller.
We note that in formal proofs of unsatisfiability, it is important to pay attention to the interpretation
of mathematical functions and constants. For example, in the context of the verification approach shown
in Fig. 1, the mechanisms used to generate traces Φs and Φ f and the SMT solver should ideally have
the same interpretation of the system dynamics. For our implementation, we use MATLAB® to produce
Φs and Φ f and dReal to address the SMT queries, but MATLAB® and dReal may have slightly different
interpretations of, for example, the exponential functions found in the activation functions and the con-
stants that define the NN weights. We sidestep this issue by assuming the following: a.) the MATLAB®
interpretation of the system dynamics is only an approximation used to generate candidate generator
functions, and b.) the system dynamics in the “deployed” implementation, including the weights and
functions used to define the NN controller, are the same used for the dReal queries.
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4 Case Study
In this section, we present a case study that we use to evaluate our verification approach. We consider a
Dubins car, where an NN controller is used to track a given path. An overview of the closed-loop system
is provided in Figure 2. We first describe the system dynamics. Then, we describe the technique we used
to develop an NN controller. Finally, we demonstrate the proposed verification approach on the case
study.
Neural Network (Controller)
Ref. Trajectory
...
P
R
E
P
R
O
C
E
S
S
IN
G
x˙ = fp(x,u)
Car Model
derr
θerr
u
ux
Figure 2: Closed-loop simulation setup.
4.1 System Dynamics
4.1.1 Vehicle Model
We first describe the kinematic model of the Dubins car. Figure 3 (a) illustrates the notation used for
the position (xv,yv) and the orientation (θv) of the vehicle on the 2-D (x,y) plane. The orientation (θv)
is defined as the clockwise angle with respect to the positive y-axis. The magnitude of the longitudinal
velocity is denoted by V .
The Dubins car model uses the following differential equations to represent the car dynamics:
x˙v =V sinθv (8)
y˙v =V cosθv (9)
θ˙v =u (10)
In the above kinematic model, u is the turn rate control, which we will refer to as steering control. For
our experiments, we assume that car velocity, V , is constant.
4.1.2 Path Following
For any given vehicle state and target path, we compute the distance error and angle error of the vehicle
with respect to the target path. Figure 3 (b) illustrates the computation of distance and angle errors. The
solid red curve represents a section of the target path. The distance error, which is denoted as derr, is
defined as the shortest distance from the vehicle coordinates to the target path. On the target path, the
closest point to the vehicle is denoted as (xp,yp). The angle error, which is denoted as θerr, is the angle
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x
yv
xv
V
θv
y
x
θr
θv
derr
θerr
(xp,yp)
(a) Dubins car model. (b) Path following errors.
Figure 3: Notation used in system dynamics.
between the vehicle orientation (θv) and the orientation of the tangent line to the target path at the point
(xp,yp). Hence, if the angle of the tangent line is defined as θr, the angle error is defined as follows:
θerr = θr−θv. (11)
The distance error, derr, is taken as negative when the angle error is negative and its absolute value is
smaller than pi , which is when the vehicle is on the right of the target path, as shown in Figure 3 (b) and
positive when the vehicle is on the left of the target path.
4.1.3 Error Dynamics
Based on the vehicle dynamics and the equations defining the path following error, we use the error
dynamics to define a system model as follows. For simplicity, we consider the target path as a straight
line with a constant orientation θr. Assume that the target path starts at the coordinate (0,0), which is
a reasonable assumption given that the origin of the coordinate system may be shifted so that the target
path starts at the origin. Then, we rotate the coordinate system by pi2 −θr radians in a clockwise direction.
In the rotated coordinate system, the target trajectory becomes the x-axis, and the rotated y coordinate of
the vehicle is taken as the distance error. This means that, when the vehicle is on the right side of the
trajectory, the distance error will be negative and vice versa when it is on the left. The following is the
distance error:
derr =−xv sin
(pi
2
−θr
)
+ yv cos
(pi
2
−θr
)
. (12)
Hence, following from Eq. 8, 9, 11 and 12, the time derivative of derr can be computed as follows:
d˙err =−x˙v cos(θr)+ y˙v sin(θr)
=−V sin(θv)cos(θr)+V cos(θv)sin(θr)
=−V sin(θr−θerr)cos(θr)+V cos(θr−θerr)sin(θr).
Furthermore, following from Eq. 10 and 11 and the fact that the path angle is constant, the time derivative
of θerr is given by:
θ˙err = θ˙r− θ˙v =−u. (13)
8 Reasoning about Safety of Learning-Enabled Components in Autonomous Cyber-physical Systems
4.1.4 Closed Loop System Dynamics
Considering the NN controller as a function, h, mapping its inputs derr and θerr to its output u, where u
is the input to the plant, the closed loop system dynamics can be defined as follows, where x denotes the
system state vector:
x = [derr θerr]T
x˙ = fp(x,u)
=
[−V sin(θr−θerr)cos(θr)+V cos(θr−θerr)sin(θr)
−u
]
y = g(x) = [derr θerr]T
u = h(y).
4.2 Learning a Controller
To learn an NN controller, we first select the structure of the network. We elect to use a feedforward
NN with one hidden layer and Nh neurons in the hidden layer. The NN takes distance and angle errors
(derr,θerr) as inputs, and it outputs steering control u. Hence, the input layer accepts two inputs, and the
output layer contains one neuron. An NN with Nh neurons in the hidden layer with the structure we have
selected has (1×Nh)+(Nh×2) weight parameters and Nh+1 bias parameters. Hence the total number
of parameters (including weights and bias values) is 4Nh+1. We used tansig for all activation functions.
The implementation of the NN is done in MATLAB® .
By starting with a random set of NN parameters, we performed direct policy search variant of re-
inforcement learning using a CMA-ES algorithm [8, 10] to find an optimal set of parameters (weights
and biases) for the NN controller. For the direct policy search, we used the blue (piecewise-linear) path
shown in Figure 4 as the target path on the x-y plane. The CMA-ES algorithm is used to optimize the
NN parameters with the goal of minimizing the path following error. From a discrete-time simulation
of the system with a controller that is using the parameters that come from CMA-ES, we compute a
corresponding cost using the following cost function:
J = ∑
k∈{0,...,N}
(
100derr2k +10
5θerr2k +100u
2
k
)
+103|(xend ,yend)− (xvN ,yvN)|2.
Note that N represents the number of discrete time steps in the simulation. The subscripted terms
derrk,θerrk and uk represent the corresponding values of derr,θerr and u, respectively, at the time step
k of the simulation. The last term in the cost function computes the error related to the Euclidean dis-
tance between the end point of the the target path, (xend ,yend), and the final position of the vehicle,
(xvN ,yvN), in the simulation.
Figure 4 illustrates some sample simulation traces from the evolution of an NN controller with 10
neurons in the hidden layer, using the policy search based on CMA-ES optimization with a maximum
number of 50 iterations and a population size of 152.
The final parameter values arrived at by the CMA-ES algorithm are used as fixed weights and biases
for the NN controller. Note that, after the training phase was completed, we validated the performance
of the controller informally by observing behaviors for a set of random reference trajectories, and we
observed reasonable performance from the system.
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Figure 4: Evolution of the NN controller during the policy search.
4.3 Verification Results
We applied the approach described in Section 3 to our case study, for a number of different versions of
the NN controller described above. Each version of the system we consider contains a different number
of neurons in the hidden layer. By evaluating our technique on this suite of systems, we demonstrate how
well the method scales with the size of the NN.
For our evaluations, we assume that the target path for the controller is a straight line. For each
verification, X0 is given by the rectangular area defined by the diagonal corners (−1.0,−pi/16) and
(1.0,pi/16), and U is the complement (outside) of the rectangle described by the diagonal corners
(−5.0,−(pi/2− ε)) and (5.0,(pi/2− ε)). The domain of interest for the barrier search is defined as
D = (X0∪U)′, where S′ is the complement of set S.
Table 1 presents the experimental results. Each row of the table reports the time taken and number
of iterations for each step of the procedure described in Fig. 1 applied to different versions of the system
shown in Fig. 2 (where the versions differ in the complexity of the neural network-based controller used).
The numbers shown correspond to average values over 30 experiments; each experiment uses a unique
seed to generate the initial simulations used to produce Φs in Fig. 1. The first column of the table
indicates how many neurons are present in the hidden layer of the NN. The second column indicates the
time spent to find a generator function (i.e., the time taken to complete the iterations of the first loop in
Fig. 1). The third column indicates the average number of iterations needed to find a generator function.
Each iteration consists of Solve LP and SMT Solver Check (5) operations as shown in Fig. 1. The third
and fourth columns indicate the average time spent in each execution of Solve LP and SMT Solver Check
(5) operations, respectively. The fifth column indicates the total amount of time spent in the operations
given in Fig. 1 and not captured in the previous columns. The last column indicates the total time.
Experimental results show that our approach scales well with the increasing number of neurons in the
10 Reasoning about Safety of Learning-Enabled Components in Autonomous Cyber-physical Systems
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
derr
- /2
- /4
0
/4
/2
er
r
Figure 5: Phase portrait with sample system trajectories, X0, U and a barrier certificate level set.
controller. We note that dReal uses heuristics to perform branch and prune operations, and although our
experimental results show that it is generally able to solve long queries quickly, in the worst-case, SMT
solutions can be costly. This occasional poor performance is exemplified in some of our experiments
(e.g., the 300 and 500 neuron cases). We refer the reader to [6, 7] for a more detailed computational
complexity analysis for dReal.
Number Computing Generator Time Spent Total
of Avg. Num. Time Spent (s.) in Other Time
Neurons Iterations LP Query Total Steps (s.) (s.)
10 3.0 1.1 4.25 43 12 55
20 1.8 1.1 2.6 21 11 32
40 1.7 1.2 5.3 26 14 40
50 1.5 1.6 4.8 35 14 49
70 2.8 1.8 15.6 106 16 122
80 1.2 1.7 4.3 28 15 43
90 1.0 2.0 4.7 27 16 43
100 1.7 1.1 4.1 21 14 35
300 1.7 1.8 379.8 698 48 746
500 1.3 1.9 379.4 536 107 643
700 1.0 2.0 19.1 41 35 76
1000 1.0 2.0 50.4 74 79 153
Table 1: Timing analysis on safety verification for various versions of the system illustrated in Fig. 2.
Figure 5 illustrates the results of verification for one of the cases captured in Table 1. The lateral axis
of the figure represents the position error (i.e., the derr state), and the vertical axis represents the angle
error (θerr). The initial condition set X0 is shown in green, and the unsafe set U is shown in red. The
simulation trajectories Φs are shown in blue; initial conditions for each trajectory are marked with an (∗)
and end points are marked with a (◦). The sample space for the initial states is theD region. The ellipsoid
between the X0 and U sets in Figure 5 is a level set of a generator function found using our approach; the
barrier properties (5), (6), and (7) are all determined to be UNSAT by the dReal SMT solver [7]. Hence,
the ellipsoid is a barrier certificate for the system, which means that the system is safe.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a technique to reason about safety of a closed-loop control system using a
learning-enabled controller. In particular, we focus on feedforward artificial neural network-based con-
trollers. The key idea of our approach is to reduce the safety verification problem to the identification
of a barrier certificate candidate, using simulations of the closed-loop system, and then perform a pos-
teriori verification of the synthesized barrier certificate. The final verification step is performed using a
nonlinear SMT solver, which permits our approach to handle neural networks with arbitrary nonlinear
activation functions. We demonstrate the feasibility of our technique on a simple closed-loop model of a
path-following ground vehicle. Future work will focus on improving the scalability of our technique and
investigating stateful controllers based on recurrent neural networks. We will also investigate algorithms
to simultaneously train the neural network while satisfying safety guarantees.
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